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LAURA NEWHART
THE BONOBO MIRROR PROJECT

I. Introduction
I undertook “The Bonobo Mirror Project” within the context of a graduate level course
entitled Primate Behavior and Conservation that was jointly sponsored by Miami
University of Ohio, the Cincinnati Zoo and Botanical Gardens, and Project Dragonfly.
The goal of such “Zoo Expedition” courses is to promote inquiry-based learning,
community involvement, and conservation. I found it both challenging and rewarding to
combine my philosophical training with this very empirically based scientific method of
inquiry. The empirical question that “The Bonobo Mirror Project” attempts to answer is:
How does the ratio of positive to negative comments made by visitors to the indoor
bonobo exhibit at the Cincinnati Zoo about the bonobos compare to the same ratio of
positive to negative comments made directly to the bonobos? I interpret the results of my
inquiry, and their moral significance, through the more subjective lens of Jean-Paul
Sartre’s solution to the traditional philosophical problem of the existence of other minds.
Our beliefs about the existence of animal minds and their varying levels of complexity
inform our moral judgments on the appropriate treatment and handling of these animals.

II. Positivism vs. Anthropomorphism
Whether we base our obligation to treat animals ethically on Singer’s position that those
animals are sentient, and hence able to feel pleasure and pain, or on Tom Regan’s more
rigorous requirement that those animals that deserve ethical treatment are subjects-of-alife in the sense that they have beliefs, desires, memories, a sense of their own future, and
a psychosocial identity over time, we still need to have knowledge concerning the
contents of their consciousness, i.e., their inner subjective experience.
The search for this knowledge has typically resulted in a clash between two
camps, i.e., the positivists, or those who are methodologically committed not to allow
anything into their theories that cannot be verified through empirical observation by the
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five physical senses, and the advocates of anthropomorphism, those who believe that we
can draw conclusions about animal consciousness/subjectivity on the basis of similarities
between their behavior and ours. On the positivist side, with the increased urgency of
demands for the ethical treatment of animals, there has been increased research activity
into the anatomy and physiology of animals, e.g., the structure of animal brains and
nervous systems, the presence of endogenous opiates, whether their physiological
responses are modified by analgesics, etc. There have also been more effective defenses
and fine-tuning of anthropomorphism, including the claim by Bernard Rollin that if
positivists are not willing to admit anything into their theories that can’t be experienced
by the senses, then in addition to the existence of animal minds, they must also give up
the existence of human minds and the inter-subjective verification by observation upon
which their method depends (137).
One seemingly effective fine-tuning of anthropomorphism has been proposed by
Josephine Donovan. Drawing on literary theory and an ethics of care, in “Feminism and
the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue,” Donovan claims that we understand
the inner states or contents of the consciousness of animals in the same way that we
understand those of people, i.e., by reading their behavior as signifiers for these inner
states. While it helps to have a general knowledge of the species to which the animal
belongs and a certain familiarity with the individual animal we are “reading,” we can
draw conclusions about the subjective experiences of animals by way of arguments from
analogy based on their similarities with humans. As Donovan states:
If that dog is yelping, leaping about, licking an open cut, and since if I had
an open wound I know I would similarly be (or feel like) crying and
moving about anxiously because of the pain, I therefore conclude that the
animal is experiencing the same kind of pain as I would and is expressing
distress about it. (50)
Thus, according to Donovan, the question of whether we can understand what the
behavior of animals means for their subjective conscious experience is a moot one. We
do it successfully all the time. Is it possible that we might be wrong in our
interpretations? Yes, but as Donovan reminds us, we can also be wrong in our
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interpretations of human behavior. In such cases, an ethic of care advises that we improve
the quality of our attention, where attention is seen as a disciplinary practice informed by
“openness, receptivity, empathy, sensitivity, and imagination” (51).

III. The Problem of Other Minds and Sartre’s Solution
As the criticism of positivism by Rollin noted above suggests, the problem of the
existence of animal minds (or the content of animal consciousness) can be viewed as a
subset of the traditional philosophical problem of the existence of other minds in general.
Simply stated, we can (and perhaps should) doubt the existence of human minds with as
little difficulty as we might doubt the existence of animal minds. The philosophical
problem of the existence of other minds is usually stated in this way: I know that I have a
mind because I have privileged access to the contents of my consciousness through
introspection. I don’t have that kind of privileged access to the contents of anyone else’s
consciousness. So, for all I know, everyone else could just be robots with disks implanted
in the backs of their necks, programming them to act as if they have a mind like mine.
For all I know, my mind could be the only one in existence.
In Being and Nothingness, French existentialist Jean Paul Sartre’s magnum opus
in which he describes in intricate detail the structures of human consciousness from a
subjective phenomenological perspective, Sartre tells us that the traditional realist
solution to the problem of other minds is to make a series of inductive inferences from
my mind to my body to your body to your mind—in short, an argument from analogy
based on physical similarities. I have a mind, and my body is like this. Your body is
similar to mine, so you must have a mind like mine as well.
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre provides a more subjective and more immediate
demonstration of the existence of other minds; and, in doing so he provides an alternative
to both positivism and anthropomorphism. For Sartre, human relations are characterized
by a battle to the death for subjectivity. Since Sartre believed we could not both be
subjects at the same time, one party in a relationship will be the subject and the other will
be the object, although there is the possibility that the two can switch places. Hence,
Sartre’s famous saying, “Hell is other people.” Sartre believed that you can tell you’re in
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the presence of another mind (or subject) when you feel yourself being taken as an object
in their consciousness; or, to use more of Sartre’s terminology, when you feel your
freedom or transcendence being “trumped,” so to speak, by theirs. As Sartre describes it:
It is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that
I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. For just
as the Other is a probable object for me-as-subject, so I can discover
myself in the process of becoming a probable object for only a certain
subject… In a word, my apprehension of the Other in the world as
probably being a man refers to my permanent possibility of being-seenby-him; that is to the permanent possibility that a subject who sees me may
be substituted for the object seen by me. “Being-seen-by-the-Other” is the
truth of “seeing-the-Other.” (256-257)
This experience of “seeing-the-Other” manifests itself as a sense of pride, possibly, but
more often shame in the object that I am for the Other, which Sartre describes as “an
immediate shudder which runs through me from head to foot without discursive
preparation” (222). It is not the result of a tenuous string of inferences from my mind to
my body to your body to your mind in the external world.

IV. The Mark Test
The impetus for “The Bonobo Mirror Project” was a paper by my colleague, Professor
Robert Mitchell, entitled “Subjectivity and Self-Recognition in Animals.” In the paper,
Mitchell describes a particular example in which the debate between positivism and
anthropomorphism implicitly plays itself out to the detriment of the goal of ascertaining
the level of complexity of consciousness or subjectivity on the part of various animals.
The example involves a mark test whereby individual animals have a visible mark placed
on their face and then are put before a mirror. The animals are observed as to whether
they make physical gestures in reference to the mark while looking in the mirror, thereby
indicating the capacity for self-recognition, which is considered to be a necessary feature
of higher levels of subjectivity. While the mark test was intended to be a more objective
measure of self-recognition than mere descriptions or anecdotes of behavior indicating
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self-recognition, it too fell prey to the variations of subjective interpretation as different
researchers disagreed about which purportedly objective observations of behavior should
count as evidence for passing the mark test, and hence for possessing the capacity for
self-recognition.
The scientists were looking for a capacity that they hoped could be intersubjectively verified through their own observations; however, they couldn’t agree on
what the behavior of the animals signified or meant for that capacity. Various researchers
had different standards for the kinds and frequencies of behavior that would justify the
conclusion that the animals recognized themselves in the mirror. Some studies required
that the animal touch the marked area more than it did in a previous session in front of the
mirror before the area was marked. Others required that the animal touch the marked area
more often while looking in the mirror than when not looking in the mirror. Others still
required that the animal touch the mark at least five times while looking in the mirror.
Mitchell quotes Swartz, Sarauw, & Evans:
[I]f the question is “What is passing?” in relation to the mark test… [t]he
easy answer is “touching the mark on the head while using the mirror to
guide the hand to the mark.” However, behavior is rarely as simple as that.
(577)
As a demonstration of the difficulties encountered in the mark test, in this video
(“Bonobo Self-Recognition In Camera Viewer”1) of a young bonobo looking into the
picture viewer of a video camera it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine from its
behavior whether the bonobo is actually recognizing itself in the viewer or not.
On the other hand, and more germane to Sartre’s response to the problem of other
minds, we might consider how comfortable we would feel hurling insults at this bonobo.

V. The Bonobo Mirror Project

1

Published on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoKiTs67J4k
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The Primate Behavior and Conservation course out of which “The Bonobo Mirror
Project” arose relied on the QUEST method of inquiry which contains the following
steps: 1) Question and observe 2) Uncover comparative questions 3) Explore predictions
4) Start action plan and gather data, and 5) Think hard about findings and share
discoveries. I found the course both challenging and rewarding in terms of the
opportunities it provided for me to bring philosophy together with this scientific method
of inquiry. My goal for the project was to attempt to determine, drawing on Sartre’s
solution to the problem of other minds and using the Quest Inquiry Method, whether
human visitors to the indoor bonobo exhibit at the Cincinnati Zoo provide behavioral
evidence that they recognize that they are in the presence of another mind (or a higher
level of consciousness or subjectivity).

A. Comparative Question and Prediction
My comparative question was: How does the relationship of positive to negative remarks
about the bonobos at the indoor exhibit at the Cincinnati Zoo and Botanical Gardens
compare to the relationship of positive to negative remarks made directly to the bonobos?
I also took into account the factors of age and gender of the visitors. My prediction was
that the ratio of positive to negative remarks made directly to the bonobos would be
greater than the ratio of positive to negative remarks made about the bonobos. I also
predicted that adults and women would make less negative remarks to the bonobos, and
children and males would make more negative remarks to the bonobos, based on the
different amounts and kinds of socialization experienced by the different groups. My
assumption was that people would not make negative remarks directly to the bonobos as
frequently as they made negative remarks about the bonobos to other people if they
sensed that they were in the presence of another mind or subject, because to do so would
bring them a feeling of shame for the objects that they would become in the
consciousness of the bonobos-as-subjects.
My prediction that the ratio of positive to negative remarks by visitors to the
bonobos would be higher than the ratio of positive to negative remarks about the
bonobos, if correct, would lend support to the conclusion that human visitors do feel
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some level of pride or shame before the bonobos, differentially reflected in their behavior
toward them as compared to their remarks about them. This, based on Sartre’s theory,
would indicate that the visitors do discern the presence of a mind or sense of personhood,
i.e., a relatively high level of complexity in terms of consciousness, on the part of the
bonobos.
Angus Gemmell concludes “Gazing into the Bonobo Mirror,” an essay on his
journey to the bonobos in the Congo, as follows:
After spending a week with the trackers, observing, absorbing, and filming
bonobos, each of us was moved by the feeling of being watched curiously
by another conscious being. When a bonobo is close and looks you in the
eye, it’s like holding a mirror up to humanity’s collective past. (41)
It is my hope that this project will provide some small amount of evidence to support this
conclusion.

B. Methods
I tested my hypothesis by engaging in three sessions of two hours each of continuous
sampling of remarks made by visitors to the indoor bonobo exhibit on two consecutive
weekends between 1:00 pm and 5:00 pm. A total of 100 visitors to the indoor bonobo
exhibit were surveyed, and 96 remarks were recorded and categorized. I recorded the
data collected on a generic behavior frequency data sheet with columns for the following
categories: number of visitor, gender of visitor, age of visitor, positive and negative
remarks, and key subject words. (Appendix 1)
One challenge that I ran into at this point was how to define positive and negative
remarks in a way that would satisfy the scientific requirements of the method of inquiry,
which favors facts over value judgments. Fortunately, I regularly teach Practical
Reasoning (PHI 100), a course in informal logic, so I was able to produce objective
definitions for positive and negative remarks:
A positive remark is defined as a remark containing words or phrases whose
dictionary definition denotes a positive evaluative judgment, e.g., good, intelligent, cute,
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etc. A positive evaluative judgment is defined as an indication that an individual or group
of individuals meets certain specifiable standards.
A negative remark is defined as a remark containing words or phrases whose
dictionary definition denotes a negative evaluative judgment, e.g., bad, stupid, ugly, etc.
A negative evaluative judgment is defined as an indication that an individual or group of
individuals does not meet certain specifiable standards.
Remarks that were ambiguous due to tone of voice or context were omitted. A
new remark was determined by a change of subject, a change of addressee, or (of course)
a change of speaker.

C. Results and Consequences
Overall Results
The overall comparison of the ratio of positive to negative remarks about the bonobos to
the ratio of positive to negative remarks to the bonobos reveals 31 positive remarks about
the bonobos to 47 negative remarks about the bonobos and 9 positive remarks to the
bonobos to 9 negative remarks to the bonobos.

Comparison of Positive and Negative Remarks
About and To Bonobos
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This result is in accordance with my prediction. However, the difference between the two
does not appear to be as dramatic as I originally anticipated. It is important to note,
however, that of the 9 negative remarks to the bonobos, 7 of them were actually
commands that I interpreted as negative remarks because they implied that the bonobos
should be doing something else. Examples of such commands include: “Be more
photogenic,” “Stand still for me,” “Play some dodge ball,” etc. One of the negative
remarks was a negative evaluation of one of the bonobo’s behavior when playing ball,
“You missed it, buddy.” Thus, only one of the negative remarks to the bonobos was
actually a direct insult, i.e., “Boo, trailer trash, you’re it.”
Some examples of positive remarks to the bonobos include: “Hey, cool bonobo!”
“Hello, sweet guy,” “I love you,” and “Hey, buddy.” The most common positive remarks
about the bonobos concerned their cuteness and their similarity to humans. The most
common negative remarks about the bonobos concerned the appearance of the female
bonobo’s behind, their grooming habits, and their behavior with their own excrement.

Results by Age and Gender
Categorizing the remarks by age and gender reveals that male children made 0 positive
remarks about the bonobos and 15 negative remarks about the bonobos. I found this to be
extremely surprising. Female children made 8 positive remarks about the bonobos and 11
negative remarks about the bonobos. Among adults, male adults made 3 positive remarks
about the bonobos and 4 negative remarks about the bonobos. Female adults made 20
positive remarks about the bonobos and 21 negative remarks about the bonobos.
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Positive and Negative Remarks About Bonobos by
Age and Gender

25
20
15
10
pos

neg

5
0
Male Child

Female Child

Male Adult

Female Adult

Female children made 1 positive remark to the bonobos and 4 negative remarks to
the bonobos. This differs slightly from my prediction, as I would have thought that male
children would make more negative remarks to the bonobos than female children.
Among adults, my predictions about the differences between genders and between ages
were more correct. Male adults made 3 positive remarks about the bonobos and 4
negative remarks about the bonobos. Male adults made 2 positive remarks to the bonobos
and 1 negative remark to the bonobos. Female adults made 20 positive remarks about the
bonobos and 21 negative remarks about the bonobos. Female adults made 4 positive
remarks to the bonobos and 1 negative remark to the bonobos. This tracks along with my
prediction that adults and women would make less negative remarks to the bonobos and
children and males would make more negative remarks to the bonobos. However, my
results also seem to indicate that the gender differences do not seem to take effect until
the onset of adulthood.
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Positive and Negative Remarks To Bonobos by
Age and Gender
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Results by Keyword
My data collection sheet includes a column for keywords in the remarks of the visitors
surveyed. Throughout the course of data collection, I noticed a number of different kinds
of remarks that occurred quite frequently. These remarks often could not be classified as
positive or negative or as being about the bonobos or directed to them. They seem to
occupy a territory in between. However, they occurred quite frequently and seem to
indicate an awareness on the part of the speakers of a relatively complex level of
consciousness or subjectivity in the bonobos, by way of self-recognition on the part of the
visitors. These remarks include what I have labeled Intentions, Identifications, and
Cooing/Baby Talk. Intentions are defined as an attributing of intentions to the bonobos
either indirectly, for example, “Look, he’s sleeping with his favorite ball”; or by putting
words into the mouths of the bonobos, e.g., “He’s saying, ‘I’m sleepy. Give me a
blanket’.” Surprisingly, the attempt to put words in the bonobos’ mouths occurred 6
times. This attempt along with the attempt to put thoughts in their heads and ascribe
motives to their behavior occurred 24 times. Identifications are defined as remarks which
either make a general claim of how the bonobos are like us, which is not surprising given
that the signage at the exhibit reports that they share approximately 98% of our DNA, but
also personal identifications, e.g., “I do that too, cuddle up and eat orange peels,” or “He
knows another monkey when he sees one,” said by an older woman to a child.
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Surprisingly, there were 7 such personal identifications. Cooing/Baby Talk is defined as
remarks about the bonobos to other people but said in a cooing tone of voice meant for
the bonobos, e.g., “Awww, look how cuuuuuuute he is,” in a tone normally used to talk
to/about human babies.
After the data collection process, I went through the keywords and categorized the
comments in terms of the content of their keywords using the following categories:
Behavior, Appearance, Environment, Intentions, Identifications, Cooing/Baby Talk, and
Miscellaneous. Out of the 78 comments recorded about the bonobos: 4 were exclusively
about their behavior with no intentions, identifications or cooing involved; 23 were about
their physical appearance with no intentions, identifications, or cooing involved; 24 were
about their intentions, 15 established identifications, and 4 involved baby talk/ cooing.
There were 5 additional miscellaneous remarks.

Content of Remarks About Bonobos

Behavior

6% 5%
5%

Appearance

30%

19%

Environment
Intentions
Identifications

31%

4%

Cooing(baby talk)
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Consequences
My results indicate that visitors to the indoor bonobo exhibit at the zoo make fewer
negative remarks relative to positive remarks to the bonobos in comparison to the same
relation of negative to positive remarks about the bonobos. Given the different kinds and
amount of socialization on the part of males and females, and children and adults,
respectively, it is to be expected that adult males will make more such negative remarks
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to the bonobos than adult females and that children will make more such negative
remarks than adults. While the sample size is too small to conclude that this study
confirms these expectations, nothing in the results refutes them. Moreover, the content of
more than half of the remarks also indicates a kind of self-recognition by the visitors in
their perceptions of the bonobos. Taken together, if Sartre’s theory concerning the role of
shame in the recognition of other minds is right (and my application of this theory to the
bonobos is valid), this data supports the conclusion that visitors to the bonobo exhibit do
discern the existence of a more complex level of consciousness or subjectivity on the part
of the bonobos.
However, these findings also open up a number of other questions that must be
answered before this data could be used to support a more ethical approach to the
treatment and handling of bonobos. Among these questions are the following: 1) Does the
relative dearth of negative remarks in relation to positive remarks to the bonobos actually
arise from the phenomenon of avoiding shame before the bonobos on the part of the
visitors? As one means of answering this question we might also ask if the results
concerning age and gender based on a relatively small sample in this study are supported
by similar results from a more statistically significant sample. 2) How do the evaluative
force and content of the remarks made about/to the bonobos compare to remarks made
about/to other animals on exhibit at the zoo? And 3) How do the responses to the
bonobos of zookeepers and those who work closely with the bonobos compare to those of
visitors to the exhibit? These questions among others may serve as springboards for
future investigative projects.

D. The Strangest Thing I Saw
Although it didn’t fit into my data, I’d like to conclude with the strangest thing I saw
during this study, which perhaps more than anything else convinces me that human
visitors discern a high level of subjectivity on the part of the bonobos through a process
of self-recognition. A middle-aged mother and teenage daughter were taunting the
bonobos with Dots candy. The mother was banging the box of Dots on the window of the
exhibit, bouncing up and down, and saying, “Look what I’ve got—yum, yum!” over and
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over. The teenage daughter was holding an individual piece of candy up to the window.
The female bonobo got so worked up at this bizarre display that she started jumping up
and down, growling loudly, and putting her fists on top of her head as if to imitate pulling
a top-knot pony tail which the mother was wearing in her hair.
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Appendix 1: Generic Behavior Frequency Data Sheet
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